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Abstract In a common-values election with two candidates voters receive a signal about
which candidate is superior. They can acquire information that improves the precision of
the signal. Electors dier in their information acquisition costs. For large electorates a
non negligible fraction of voters acquires information, but the quantity of informed voters
and the quality of acquired information decline so fast that information aggregation fails to
obtain.
JEL Classication: C72, D72, D82
Keywords: Costly Information Acquisition, Condorcet Jury Theorem.1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that voters have little and uneven knowledge about policies and the back-
grounds of elected governmental oﬃcials (see, for instance, Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). These facts
are consistent with the rational ignorance hypothesis formulated by Schumpeter (1950) and Downs (1957):
individual voters will choose to acquire little information, since each individual’s vote has little impact on
the outcome of a large election and information acquisition is costly. Determining the implications of this
hypothesis has important implications about the quality of democratic deliberations.
A vast empirical literature attempts to assess the extent to which political judgments and deliberations
would diﬀer if voters were well informed (see Althaus 1998, 2003, Gilens 2001). According to Althaus (2003)
“Knowledge does matter, and the way it is distributed in society can cause collective preferences to reﬂect
disproportionately the opinions of some groups more than others. Sometimes collective preferences seem to
represent something like the will of the people, but frequently they do not”.
A ﬁrst view suggests that the informational failure can be so severe that the vote would not be more
likely to reﬂect the (informed) will of the electorate than a fair toss coin. Scholars have long feared that
democracies cannot function if they are too large. Polybius (1992, book 6) in the second century B.C. argued
that ochlocracy (mob-rule) is a natural evolution of democracy . In Madison’s (in Hamilton 1788, 9 and 14)
opinion the United States and even some states were too vast for direct democracy.
A second view suggests that aggregate opinion may be able to reﬂect the public interests even when most
individuals are poorly informed. Condorcet (1786) argued that the larger is the population, the higher is
the probability that a democracy will make the ‘right’ decision. According to this argument, in the process
of preference aggregation, the more or less random opinion of poorly informed voters would cancel out (see
Wittman 1989, 1995). This statement constitutes the so called Condorcet Jury Theorem.
The objective of this paper is to investigate how costly information acquisition in a large and heteroge-
neous electorate inﬂuences the quality of voting outcomes. A model where voters have to decide over two
alternatives, A and B is introduced. Voters have common preferences but they do not know which one of the
alternatives is better for them. They do not have free access to a reliable font of information, but they can
acquire some information. Acquiring precise information is costly and voters may diﬀer in their abilities of
1collecting and processing information, which reﬂects in diﬀerent information acquisition costs. A voter who
acquires information of quality x receives the correct signal with probability 1
2 +x and faces a cost of C (;x)
where  is her type. C is strictly convex and increasing in x. Types with higher types faces increasingly
higher costs.
The model incorporate the features of Martinelli’s (2006, 2007). In Martinelli (2006) electors can acquire
information of diﬀerent quality but they all have the same cost function. Martinelli (2007) allows for hetero-
geneity in information acquisition costs but voters can buy information of one given quality. So Martinelli
(2006, 2007) cannot account for uneven levels of information. Both works conclude that (at least partial)
information aggregation in large election is always possible.
We focus on symmetric equilibriua and prove that an equilibrium with information acquisition exists if
and only if the expected gains from reaching the right decision are equal at every state. As the number of
electors grows the probability that any elector is decisive converges to zero. Only the electors with lower
information acquisition costs acquire information. The fraction of informed electors and the expected quality
of information they acquire decreases to zero. Asymptotically, the probability that the elections will reach
the right decision converges to one half.
We investigate whether access to cheaper information can alleviate this informational failure. In this model
the costs of information depend on two factors: the quality of information and the type of the agent. We
prove that elections produce eﬃcient results only if the marginal cost of acquiring information increases
at a slower with respect to both the precision of information and the type of the agents, formally only
if Cxx (0;0) = Cx (0;0) = 0. In this case an equilibrium with information acquisition exists for every
parameter speciﬁcation and elections perfectly aggregate information: the probability of reaching the right
decision converges to one when the size of the population grows to inﬁnity.
We reach diﬀerent conclusions with respect to Martinelli (2006,2007) because our model jointly incorpo-
rates the feature he studies separately. In Martinelli (2006) voters acquire information of decreasing quality
but every elector acquires the same quality of information (they have the same costs) so information ag-
gregates, even if incompletely. In Martinelli (2007) a decreasing part of the electorate acquire information
but the quality of information acquired is always the same so information aggregates. In our paper the two
eﬀects combine: a decreasing part of the electorate acquires information of decreasing quality as the number
2of voters grows. For this reason also the conditions for information aggregation are more demanding.
The introduction of heterogeneity in information acquisition costs allows to account for three empirically
relevant facts:
(i) A small fraction of the electorate is informed.
(ii) The overall quality of information electors have is limited.
(iii) The distribution of information across electors is uneven.
Martinelli (2006) can account only for (ii) and Martinelli (2007) only for (i), none for (iii). The only paper
which reﬂects (iii) is Oliveros (2006) who takes an orthogonal approach: voters have the same information
acquisition costs but they diﬀer in the losses they bear when the wrong decision is taken. He proves aggrega-
tion results similar to Martinelli (2006). In this model the existence of equilibria with information acquisition
heavily relies on the introduction of “stubborn voters”. A fraction of them always votes for alternative, A
while the others vote for alternative B. In this way the probability that a voter is decisive is bounded away
from zero.
The structure of the article is the following. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes
equilibria with information acquisition. Section 4 tackles the existence of equilibria with information acqui-
sition and its aggregation properties. Section 5 studies the aggregate costs of information acquired and the
asymptotic eﬃciency of equilibria. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
The paper is related to the line of research about the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The ﬁrst proofs were entirely
statistical (see Berg 1993, Berend and Paroush 1998, Ladha 1992, 1993). They assumed that each individual
privately observes a signal about the right candidate and then vote sincerely according to the signal. More
recently the theorem has been proved under the assumption of strategic voting (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and
Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1997, 1999, and Myerson 1998). But all these papers assume
that the information is freely available to voters. Interestingly Paroush (1998), in a non strategic setup,
proved that elections can fail to aggregate information if the probability a voter receives the correct signal
is not bounded away from one half. Yariv (2004) analyzes majority voting in common value two-option
environments where voters have private information, the quality of which exogenous depends on the size of
3the electorate. She proves that information of low quality may lead to informational failures. In this paper
we endogeneize the causes of the decreasing quality of information. In a recent work Mandler (2007) proved
a similar negative result: if voters are uncertain of the quality of the initial signal elections can loose their
ability to aggregate information.
The literature focusing on voting in committee has recently considered the issue of costly information
acquisition. Persico (2004) and Mukkhopadhaya (2005) consider a setting in which committee members have
identical and ﬁxed costs of acquiring information. In this setup there is a maximum number of voters who
can acquire information at equilibrium so that for large electorates there is no equilibrium with information
acquisition. Oliveros (2007) presents a model based on Oliveros (2006) in which voters have the same
information acquisition costs but they diﬀer in the gains obtained from taking the right decisions. Voters
can select whether to vote or abstain and the amount of information to acquire. He proves that there are
equilibria where voters collect information of diﬀerent qualities, there are informed voters that abstain, and
information and abstention need not be inversely correlated for all voters.
2 The Model
There are N = 2n + 1 voters and two states of the world ! = a;b. Electors have to select between two
alternatives, A and B by majority voting. The prior probability of state a is qa and the prior probability
of state b is qb = 1   qa. Before voting agents independently receive a signal s 2 fsa;sbg. Before receiving





. When a voter receives a signal of quality x the
likelihood of receiving the signal s! conditional to ! is p(s! j !;x) = 1
2 +x. Voters have diﬀerent acquisition
costs. One interpretation is literal: voters bear diﬀerent costs of access to information. According to a
diﬀerent one voters have diﬀerent ability in processing information or they have access to diﬀerent fonts of
information. So less skilled agents must invest more eﬀort in order to extract the same amount of information.
An elector of type  bears a cost C (x;) to purchase information of quality x. Types are distributed in the
interval [0;1], independently across the electorate. Let the types of each elector be distributed according to
a continuous density function f : [0;1] ! R+, with f (0) 6= 0.






and has the following properties:
4NFL C (0;) = 0 and C (x;) > 0 for all x > 0 and for all .





;and for all  > 0. Cx (0;0) = 0 and
Cxx (0;0) > 0.
SCR C (x;) > 0, Cx (x;) > 0 for all x > 0 and for all  > 0. Cx (0;0) > 0.
Property NFL (no free lunch) states that acquiring a positive amount of information has a strictly positive
cost, while acquiring no information entails no costs. Property CONV (convexity) states that the cost
function is strictly increasing and strictly convex for all types. Type zero has zero marginal costs. Property
SCR (single crossing) states that higher types  face increasingly higher costs.
We study the robustness of our results with respect to these assumption. We will analyze two cases where
condition CONV and/or SCR are replaced by WCONV and WSCR.





;and for all  > 0. Cx (0;0) = 0,
Cxx (0;0) = 0. There exists k 2 N such that Cx(k) (0;0) 6= 0.
WSCR C (x;) > 0, Cx (x;) > 0 for all x > 0 and for all  > 0. Cx (0;0) = 0. There exists
k 2 N such that Cx(k) (0;0) 6= 0.
If WCONV holds the marginal cost of acquiring information of the lowest type is lower than with respect to
when CONV holds. If WSCR holds the marginal cost of acquiring information of the lower types increases
at a slower rate withe respect to when SCR holds.
At state ! = a;b, the utility of a voter of type , who has invested in a level of signal precision x is,
depending on the decision d 2 fA:Bg taken is: U (d;!)   C (x;) for d = A;B. We assume that A is the
best alternative at state a and B is the right alternative at state b, which is U (A;a)   U (B;a) = Ua > 0
and U (B;b)   U (A;b) = Ub > 0.
For every voter of a given type a strategy speciﬁes: (i) how much information she acquires and (ii) for which
alternative she votes after receiving the signal.






of a voting strategy v : [0;1]  fsa;sbg ! fA;Bg such that x is measurable and v (;s) is measurable for
s 2 fsa;sbg.
5A strategy of player i is denoted by (xi;vi), a strategy proﬁle (xi;vi)i=1;:::;2n+1 is denoted by (X;V ) and
(X;V ) i is the coalitional strategy of all voter but i. Given (X;V ) i, we denote by





d j !;v;(X;V ) i

the expected utility from voting v at state !, net of information acquisition costs, where Pr
 
d j !;v;(X;V ) i

is the probability the outcome is d at state !.
Given investment choice x and after receiving signal s 2 fsa;sbg, the expected utility from voting v is
U
 





U (v j !)Pr(! j (x;s))
where Pr(! j (x;s)) is the likelihood of ! given investment x and signal s.
The expected utility from a player investing x and using a voting rule from using a strategy (x;v) when other
agents play (X;V ) i is
U
 






v j x;s;(X;V ) i

p(s)
where p(s)is the probability of receiving the signal s.
The equilibrium concept we employ is symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.





= (^ x; ^ v)i=1;:::2n+1satisﬁes:
1. U
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for all  2 [0;1], for all v 2 fA;Bg
and for all s 2 fsa;sbg.
2. U















 C (x;) for all  2 [0;1] for all voting
rules v.
An SBE with information acquisition is a SBE where a non-zero measure of types acquires information.
6In a symmetric equilibrium all players agents employ the same strategy, voting strategies are optimal
conditional to the signals received and information acquisition strategies are ex ante optimal.
Observe that SBE with no information acquisition always exist: voters do not acquire information and
at least n + 2 of them vote for the same alternative independently on their type and signal.
When no ambiguity is possible we omit any reference to (X;V ) i. We now introduce some mathematical
notation. Let f;g : X ! R where X is a metric space. Let z 2 X. We write f  g for x ! z if
limx!z
f(x)
g(x) = 1, f = o(g) for x ! z if limx!z
f(x)
g(x) = 0 and f = O(g) forx ! z if there exists C > 0 such
that jf (x)j  C jg (x)j in a neighborhood of z. Let fangn2N and fbngn2N two sequences of real numbers. We
write an  bn if limn!1
an
bn = 1, an = o(bn) if limn!1
an
bn = 0 and an = O(bn) if there exists C > 0 such
thatjanj  C jbnj for n large enough. With  we denote the standard normal distribution.
3 Characterization
The utility (net of information acquisition costs) that a voter derives from a voting strategy (va;vb) is
X
!2fa;bg
p!q! [U (va j !)p(sa j !) + U (vb j !)p(sb j !)] + U i
where p! = p
 
piv j !;(X;V ) i

is the probability a player is pivotal at state !, given other voters’




is a term that depends only on the strategies taken by agents other
than i.
A voter who ignores the signal is always strictly better oﬀ by not investing in information. By playing
(0;A;A), her expected utility is







+ paqaU (B j a) + pbqbU (A j b) + U i
By playing (0;B;B), her expected utility is:







+ paqaU (B j a) + pbqbU (A j b) + U i
Observe that U (0;A;A)  U (0;B;B) if and only if paqaUa  pbqbUb.
The beneﬁt from acquiring x units of information and following the signal U (x;A;B) is






+ paqaU (B j a) + pbqbU (A j b)   C (;x) + U i
Let  = (pa;pb) such that
(paqaUa + pbqUb)   Cx (;0) = 0 (1)
if any exists and set  = (pa;pb) = 1 otherwise. Type (pa;pb) is the lowest type for whom is optimal
not to acquire information. The function (pa;pb) is diﬀerentiable in the interior of the set where (pa;pb)







and lim(pa;pb)!0(pa;pb) = 0.1 So, for pa and pb small, (pa;pb) 2 (0;1).
Thus, the optimal information investment for type , x = x(;pa;pb) solves
(paqaUa + pbqbUb) = Cx (;x) (2)
for   (pa;pb). If  > (pa;pb), then x(;pa;pb) = 0. For (pa;pb) 6= 0 and 0   < (pa;pb) from the
1If condition STR holds  is diﬀerentiable at (0;0), too.
8implicit function theorem we have









and lim(pa;pb)!0x(;pa;pb) = 0 for every .2The function, x(;pa;pb) is strictly increasing in p! for
! = a;b and strictly decreasing in for   (pa;pb), x(;pa;pb).
For a voter of type  is optimal to follow the signal if and only if
U (x(;pa;pb);A;B)  maxfU (0;A;A);U (0;B;B)g
U (x(;pa;pb);A;B)  maxfU (0;A;A);U (0;B;B)g or, equivalently if and only if
(paqaUa + pbqUb)x   C (;x) 
jpbqbUb   paqaUaj
2
for x = x(;pa;pb).
Let 0 (pa;pb), satisfying




for x = x(;pa;pb) if any exists and let 0 (pa;pb) = 1 otherwise. Finally set
 (pa;pb) = minf0 (pa;pb);(pa;pb)g
and observe that  (pa;pb) = (pa;pb) if an only if pbqbUb = paqaUa, otherwise  (pa;pb) < (pa;pb).
Given (pa;pb), every type    (pa;pb) acquires the positive amount of information determined by Equation
2 and every type  >  (pa;pb) does not acquire information. If pbqbUb = paqaUa the voters who do
2If condition CONV holds xis diﬀerentiable for(pa;pb) = (0;0), too.
9not acquire information are indiﬀerent among the two alternatives. Otherwise, they vote for alternative A if







be the expected amount of information acquired by a voter of unknown type. Let () 2 f0;1g be
the probability a voter of type  >  (pa;pb) votes for A and set ~ (pa;pb) =
R 1
(pa;pb)()f ()d =
(pa;pb)(1   F ( (pa;pb))) for some (pa;pb) 2 [0;1].  is the conditional probability a voter of unknown








The probability a voter votes for alternative A at state a is:
F ( (pa;pb))
2
+ ~ x(pa;pb) + ~  =
1
2
+ ~ x(pa;pb) + (pa;pb)(1   F ( (pa;pb)))
The probability a voter votes for alternative A at state b is:
F ( (pa;pb))
2
  ~ x(pa;pb) + ~  =
1
2
  ~ x(pa;pb) + (pa;pb)(1   F ( (pa;pb)))








  [~ x(pa;pb) + (pa;pb)(1   F ( (pa;pb)))]
2
n








  [~ x(pa;pb)   (pa;pb)(1   F ( (pa;pb)))]
2
n










10Let  (pa;pb) < 1, then  + 1
2 coincides with the probability of a type votes for A, conditional of not
acquiring information. If  = 0, ~ (pa;pb)is the median of the conditional distribution.








so that for ! = a;b






for some C > 0.
If Cx (0;0) 6= 0 and for n large enough no voter of any type would acquire information. We can summarize
these ﬁndings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 A BSE with information acquisition equilibrium exists if and only if there are (pa;pb) 2
[0;1]
2 n f(0;0)g and  such that (Pa (pa;pb);Pb (pa;pb)) = (pa;pb). Equilibrium strategies are given by
(x;v), where:
1. (x;v)() = (x(;pa;pb;A;B)) for    (pa;pb),
2. (x;v)() = (0;A;A) if  >  (pa;pb) and pbqbUb   paqaUa > 0,
3. (x;v)() = (0;B;B) if  >  (pa;pb) and pbqbUb   paqaUa < 0,
4. (x;v)() = (0;A;A) if  (pa;pb) <   ~ (pa;pb) and pbqbUb   paqaUa = 0,
5. (x;v)() = (0;B;B) if ~ (pa;pb) <   1 and pbqbUb   paqaUa = 0.
Given any sequence of SBE and corresponding pivotal probabilities (pan;pbn): limn!1p!n = 0, for ! = a;b.
4 Existence and informational failure(s)
For every n let (xn;vn) be a SBE strategy with 2n + 1 agents. Let pn = (pan;pbn) be the corresponding
pivotal probabilities. Set n =  (pn) and set ~ xn = ~ x(pn). Finally let n = (pn) .
In every SBE with information acquisition and for large n, uninformed voters are indiﬀerent between the
two alternatives.
11Lemma 1 For n large, in every SBE with information acquisition panqaUa = pbnqbUb .
As the probability of being pivotal converges to 0 for large electorates the cutoﬀ type, n and the quality
of information acquired by every agent, ~ xn converge to 0. In order to estimate how much information elections
aggregate we need to estimate the speed of convergence to 0 of these quantities.











~ xnk   nk (1   F (nk))















In particular, the elections are asymptotically eﬃcient along the subsequence if and only if lI = lII = 1.
The proof is based on Lemma 1 and on the Berry-Esseen theorem (see Chow and Teicher 1997, p 322),
which provides an estimate of the speed of converge to the standard normal distribution of the normalized
sum of i.i.d random variables.
Theorem 1 For n large an equilibrium with information acquisition exists if and only if qaUa = qbUb.
As n ! 1 the probability of taking the right decision converges to 1
2 along every sequence of equilibria with
information acquisition.
The proof of Theorem 1 is broken in diﬀerent lemmata.
Lemma 2 If qaUa = qbUb a SBE with information acquisition exists.
12Once the pivotal probabilities are known the amount of information acquired in equilibrium is determined.
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 it follows that pa = pb = p and  = 0. In this way we can reduce the
dimension of the problem and work in the space of pivotal probabilities instead than in the inﬁnite dimensional
strategy space. Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem is employed in order to proof that Pa0 (pa;pb) has a ﬁxed point.
The next result evaluates the speed of convergence of n; ~ xn to 0.
Lemma 3 For every sequence of equilibria with information acquisition, limn!1n = 0, limn!1
p
n~ xn = 0
and limn!1
p
n(~ xn  n (1   F (n))) = 0.
In Martinelli (2006 and 2007) limn!1
p
n(~ xn  n (1   F (n))) > 0. While in Martinelli (2007) an
equilibrium with information acquisition exists for
qaUa
qbUb in a neighborhood of 1, in our setup an equilibrium
with information acquisition exists if and only if
qaUa
qbUb = 1. The reason is that the pivotal probabilities goes
to zero so fast that the marginal beneﬁt of acquiring information is surpassed by its marginal costs. In order
to prove the result we show that ~ xn goes to 0 at the same speed of p2
an.
From Lemma 3and Proposition 2 we have:
Corollary 1 Along every sequence of SBE with information acquisition the probability of taking the right
decision converges to 1
2 when the size of the population converges to inﬁnity.
Lemma 3 is then used to prove the last part of Theorem 1.
Lemma 4 If qaUa 6= qbUb a SBE with information acquisition does not exist for n large.
Intuitively, replacing CONV by WCONV reduces the marginal costs of acquiring information for the
lowest types so they should acquire information of higher quality. Replacing SCR by WSCR reduces the
growth of marginal costs when the type increases so the cut-oﬀ type should be higher.
Nonetheless The same negative results hold when 3. is replaced by 3’ but 2 holds and when 2 is replaced
by 2’ but 3 holds. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1
Theorem 2 Assume C satisﬁes NFL, CONV, WSCR or it satisﬁes properties NFL, WCONV, SCR. For
n large an equilibrium with information acquisition exists if and only if qaUa = qbUb. As n ! 1 the
probability of taking the right decision converges to 1
2.
13In order for the election to aggregate information it is needed that both CONV and SCR are replaced by
WCONV and WSCR respectively. It turns out that, in this case the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds.
Theorem 3 Assume C satisﬁes NFL, WCONV and WSCR. If qa > 0 and if n is large an equilibrium with
information acquisition exists and the probability of taking the right decision converges to 1 as n ! 1.
5 The aggregate cost of information and voters’ welfare





Proposition 3 Along a sequence of equilibria with information acquisition the aggregate cost of information
converges to zero as the number of voters goes to inﬁnite.







































n(~ xn   n (1   F (n)))
14The expected utility of the best uninformative equilibrium is
U0 = qaU (A j a) + qbU (A j b)
When hold, the expected utility of a voter converges to
U1 = qaU (A j a) + qbU (B j b)
which is the maximum possible value of utility that can be reached then the equilibria are asymptotically
eﬃcient.
In all other cases let qaUa = qbUb = r, otherwise SBE with information acquisition do not exist. The
expected utility of every voter converges to U0 that coincides with the utility of every uninformed equilibrium.
Assume that 1,2,3. Let ~ n = 1 p






for every   ~ nand set x() = 0 otherwise. Let types   ~ nvoting according to the
signal, types with ~ n <   nvoting for A and types in n <   1 voting for B. If it is the case
p





for some C > 0, so that limn!1
p
n~ xn = l, where l satisﬁes l = Ce 4l
2
.
Furthermore, (2n + 1)
R (pa;pb)
0 C (;x((pa;pb)))f ()d ! 0. So the sequence of equilibria are not asymp-
totically eﬃcient.
Choosing appropriately ~ n = n ,  > 0 the same result can be proved also when 1,2’,3 or 1,2,3’ hold.
Proposition 4 If either NFL, CONV and SCR or NFL, CONV and WSCR or NFL, WCONV and SCR
hold SBE with information acquisition are asymptotically ineﬃcient. If NFL, WCONV and WSCR hold
they are asymptotically eﬃcient.
156 Conclusions
When voters can acquire information of diﬀerent qualities and have diﬀerent information acquisition results
large election fail to aggregate information, in general. This is consistent with the most pessimistic view of the
rational ignorance hypothesis. Information aggregation is possible only under quite restrictive assumptions.
There are aspects not reﬂected here could have important implications. First of all, in our model infor-
mation acquisition is independent among voters. It is not clear the impact of communication or correlation
among diﬀerent sources of information as it would introduce new strategic considerations.3 Furthermore, the
information and its cost are exogenously provided. Competition among information providers might reduce
its costs and improve election eﬃciency. Also the possibility of abstention might aﬀect our results. If less
informed voters abstain the probability an informed voter is decisive increases and so the incentive to acquire
information (see also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999)).
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. By contradiction, assume there exist a sequence of equilibria with information ac-
quisition such that panqaUa > pbnqbUb for inﬁnitely many n. With no loss of generality we assume
panqaUa > pbnqbUb for every n. So the highest type who acquire information,  =  (pan;pbn) and




Cx (;x) = panqaUa + pbnqUb
(panqaUa + pbnqUb)x   C (;x) =
panqaUa pbnqbUb
2
Set y = panqaUa + pbnqUb and set z =
panqaUa pbnqbUb
2 .
Consider the system 8
> > <
> > :
Cx (;x) = y
yx   C (;x) = z
(4)
3Gerardi and Yariv (2007) study a model of pre-voting communication communication, without information acquisition.
16Let   satisfying
Cx ( ;0) = y:
Such an   exists for y small enough. The equation
Cx (;x) = y (5)
has a solution x if and only if     . Such solution, xI () is unique and it is a continuous and strictly
decreasing function of .
The equation
yx   C (;x) = z (6)
has a solution if and only if if and only if





If this condition is met, for every  the solution is unique. We denote it by xII () , which is continuous.
Observe that the graphs of xI and xII never intersect in their interior, because the derivative of xII ()
explodes and changes of sign when it intersects xI ().
If





then xII (0) > xI (0). In this case the only possible solution of of system4 is  =   and x = 0. At the
corresponding SBE we have (pan;pbn) =  (pan;pbn), in contradiction with panqaUa > pbnqbUb.
If





the only possible solution of system 4 is  = 0 and x = xI (0). At the corresponding SBE we have
(pan;pbn) = 0. If it was the case only a zero measure set of voters would acquire information and with
probability one all types would vote for alternative A, so the probability of being pivotal would be null, a
17contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Without loss of generality assume that the sequences themselves converge.
Given equilibrium strategies, let the event of a given voter voting for A in state a corresponds to a Bernoulli
trial with probability of success 1







2 + ~ xn + n (1   F (n)) if voter i votes forA
1
2   [~ xn + n (1   F (n))] if voter i votes for B
The V n
i are i.i.d. Furthermore,E (V n
















4   2[~ xn + n (1   F (n))]
4.




















  (2n + 1)[~ xn + n (1   F (n))]
The probability of reaching the right alternative at state a is 1   Fn (Jn) where
Jn =
 1
2   (2n + 1)[~ xn + n (1   F (n))]
rn
1





















n[~ xn + n (1   F (n))]
	
From the Berry-Esseen Theorem (see Chow and Teicher 1997, p 322).



















whether lI is ﬁnite or inﬁnite.
The proof of the case ! = b is similar.
Proof of Lemma 2. It must be the case that pa = pb = p (see Lemma 1). Furthermore with the
notation of Proposition 1,  = 0. Set r = qaUa. Let ^ (p) satisfying 2rp = Cx (;0) if any such  exists
and ^ (p) = 1 otherwise. The function ^ (p) is continuous. Let the function x(;p) be deﬁned on [0; ^ (p)]

























The function T : [0;1] ! [0;1] is well deﬁned and continuous so it has a ﬁxed point. Let p be a ﬁxed point
of T. Deﬁne ~  as follows:




1   F (^ (p))
2
:
Type ~  is the median type, conditional on the types who do not acquiring information. Consider the
strategy (x;v), where (x;v)() = (x(;p);A;B) for   ^ (p), (x;v)() = (0;A;A) for (p)   < ~ 
and (x;v)() = (0;A;A) for ~  <   1. It is easily seen that (x;v)i = (x;v) for i = 1;:::2n + 1 is a SBE.
We next prove that there is information acquisition. By contradiction assume that there is no information




4n 6= 0 , a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) From Proposition 1, at any equilibrium paqaUa = pbqbUb. Let p 2 [0;1]
and r be such that pr = paqaUa = pbqbUb. Let Let ^ (p) satisfying 2rp = Cx (;0) if any such  exists
and ^ (p) = 1 otherwise. The function^ (p) is continuous. Let the function x(;p) be deﬁned on [0; ^ (p)]
satisfying 2rp = Cx (;x) for very  2 [0; ^ (p)]. Deﬁne ~ x(p) =
R ^ (p)
0 x(;p)f ()d. From Proposition 1














  [~ x(pa;pb) + (1   F (^ (pa;pb)))]
2
n








  [~ x(pa;pb)   (1   F (^ (pa;pb)))]
2
n



























2pqaUa = Cx (;x(;p))
and
2pqaUa = Cx ((p);0)


















20Observe that the second partial derivatives of C are continuous so that Cxx , Cx are bounded away from
zero in a neighborhood of (0;0) and (p) = O(p) uniformly in a neighborhood of 0. For p ! 0 and  < (p),
for some  2 (;(p))
x(;p) =  x (;p)((p)   ) + xp (;p)p =
Cx (;p)
Cxx (;p)








((p)   ) +
2qaUa
Cx (0;0)
p + o(p) + o()













































For p ! 0.






























  [~ xn   n (1   F (n))]
2
n
21Assume limn!1n = M exists and is non negative.4 Observe that M = limn!1~ x(p)+(1   F ((p)))  0
and that  M = limn!1~ x(p)   (1   F ((p))).
















































Combining the two equivalence we obtain the claim.
Now let 0 < M < 1
2 . Set  =
q
1
4   M2 and set yn = [~ xn   n (1   F (n))]
2   M2 = o(1) and set
zn =
p
n[~ xn   n (1   F (n))]

































4There is no loss of generality: the argument can be used along every convergent subsequence.
22Then, 7 imply that






But then, as n ! 1
n(yn   zn) =  4nn (1   F (n)) e xn ! 0
because  < 1
2. A contradiction.
The case M = 1
2 is similar. In order to conclude and obtain a contradiction one has to observe that now






for every  > 0. So it must be that M = 0.















  (e x(pa;pb) + (1   F ((pa;pb))))
2
n








  (e x(pa;pb)   (1   F ((pa;pb))))
2
n
= Cx ((pa;pb);0) (9)
Assume an equilibrium with information exists for inﬁnitely many n. Let fnkgk2N be a subsequence such






























but according to Lemma 1. This is possible only if qaUa = qbUb.
Proof of Corollary 1.The claim follows from Lemma 3 and Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Lemmas 1, 2 hold also when CONV is replaced by WCONV and when SCR is
replaced by WSCR. Consider ﬁrst the case where SCR is replaced by WSCR The proof of the other results
need only minor changes. Here we sketch them. Let k be the minimal integer such that D = Cx(k)(0;0) 6= 0.






Working as in the proof of Lemma 3, we get
e xn = C (pan)
1+ 1
k
as n ! 1, from which the claims of Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 1 follow exactly as above.







. Let k be the lowest integer such that Cx(k) (0;0) 6= 0





4paqaUa = 2Cx (;x) = 2Cx (0;0) + Cx(k) (0;0)xk 1 + o() + o
 
x2
uniformly in   (pa); and in x  x(0;pa).






x(;p) t (Cx(k) (0;0))
  1

















































from which the claims of Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 1 follow exactly as above.
Proof of Theorem 3. Also in this case Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 hold. First assume Cxxx (0;0) 6= 0
and Cx (0;0) 6= 0.
At every SBE pan =
qbUb












and set ~ x(p) = ~ x
qbUb
qaUap;p. Observe that Cxxx (0;0) > 0 and Cx (0;0) > 0.



























xx (0;0)   Cx (0;0)Cxxx (0;0)]2 + 4pqbUb
Cxxx (0;0)
+ o() + o(
p
p)
uniformly in    (p) (see also Segala 1999), because x is non negative.








































Cx (0;0) + 2
p
[C2









Simplifying and eliminating inﬁnitesimal of higher order:
~ x(p) t Cplog (p)
for some constant C < 0.
Observe that if qbUb = qaUa then Lemma 2 holds.
































n~ xn = 1
We can conclude with Proposition 2.
Now assume qbUb < qaUa. For every ; 2 [0;1] deﬁne x(;) as a solution of




















1   4[e x() + (1   F ())]
2
on








1   4[e x()   (1   F ())]
2
on
= Cx (;0) (11)
The SBE has information acquisition if and only if  1
2 <  < 1
2 so that  > 0. Let I
n () the solution
of equation 10 and let II
n () the solution of equation 11. The function I





















(1   F (I
n))
The function II

























n < 0 < II
n < 1
2 and 0 < I
n < II

















n so that in order to prove that a SBE with information acquisition exists for n
large enough it suﬃces to prove that II  I  
II
for n large enough . The left hand side of equation 10








































































































































28Without loss of generality assume n  0 for inﬁnitely many n.5
>From
~ x(pbn) t Cpbnlog (pbn)
we have
p



























qbUb it follows that also
limn!1
p
n[~ xn   n (1   F (n))] = 1
We can conclude by Proposition 2.
Now we consider the most general case. Let k1be the lowest k such that Cx(k) (0;0) 6= 0 and let k2be the
lowest k such that Cx(k) (0;0) 6= 0. Then, for every positive constants C1;C2;C3.
Cx (;x) = o
 
C1x2 + 2C2x + C32
for   (p) and x  x(0;p) for p ! 0.




2   C1C3)2 + 4pqbUb
C1





2   C1C3)2 + 4pqbUb
C1
= O(x(;p))
5Otherwise the same procedure applies to pan.
29for   (p) and x  x(0;p) for p ! 0.
Integrating like in the ﬁrst part of the proof one obtains that
jp(logp)j = O(~ x(p))
from which follows the claim.
Proof of proposition 4. Assume 1,2,3 hold then qaUa = qbUb and pan = pbn = pn. Furthermore,
D(~ xn)  E (pn)
2  C (n)












+C (0;0)2 + 2Cx (0;0)(x(;pn))f ()d






























C (;x(;pn))f ()d  nF3
n




C (;x(;pn))f ()d ! 0
as n ! 1.
The cases where 1, 2,3’ or 1, 2’, 3 hold are proved proved similarly.
Now assume that Cxx (0;0) = Cx (0;0) = 0 and that qaUa = qbUb. We have pan = pbn = pn. We have:
30p






and , n D
p










C (0;0)32 + C (0;0)3+
+3Cx (0;0)2x(;pn) + 3Cxx (0;0)(x(;pn))
2 + 2Cxxx (0;0)(x(;pn))
3 f ()d

















which converges to zero. So does the aggregate cost. The proof of the case qaUa > qbUa is identical.
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